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Abstract
We characterise optimal fiscal policies in a Real Business Cycle model when the government
has access to consumption taxation but cannot credibly commit to future policies. Contrary to
the case where only labour and capital income are taxed, the optimal time-consistent policies
are remarkably similar to their Ramsey counterparts, as long as the capital income tax causes
some distortion within the period. The welfare gains from commitment are negligible, while
they are substantial without consumption taxation. Further, the welfare gains from taxing
consumption are much higher without commitment. These results suggest that the policy-
maker’s ability to commit is of secondary importance if consumption is taxed optimally.
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1 Introduction
Most of the literature on optimal fiscal policy rules out consumption taxation, a policy
instrument which is used in most industrialised economies. For example, as of January 1,
2015, the value-added tax on standard items ranges from 17 to 27 percent in European
Union countries. Papers which consider consumption taxation include Coleman (2000), who
finds, under the assumption that the fiscal authority can fully commit to future policies,
that replacing income taxes with consumption taxes would lead to large welfare gains in the
United States. Correia (2010) extends this result to a heterogeneous-agents framework. Two
recent contributions highlight the role of consumption taxation as a tool to relax a constraint
of the monetary authority on the nominal interest rate, either as a result of the zero lower
bound (Correia, Farhi, Nicolini, and Teles, 2013) or in a monetary union (Farhi, Gopinath,
and Itskhoki, 2014).
This paper finds a new benefit of consumption taxation: discretionary policies and the
resulting allocations are almost identical to those under Ramsey policy. This holds for the
steady state, for policy dynamics in a deterministic framework, and for the cyclical properties
of tax rates and allocations in a stochastic environment. A necessary condition for these
findings is that capital income taxation causes some distortion within the period. This
result means that the policy-maker’s ability to commit is of secondary importance as long
as consumption can be taxed. In other words, the negative effects of policy-makers’ lack of
credibility, due to political business cycles, political disagreement, default on past promises,
etc., can be overcome by taxing consumption optimally.
The novelty of our paper lies in analysing time-consistent fiscal policies when the policy-
maker has access to consumption taxation, in addition to labour and capital income taxation.
The existing literature on Markov-perfect policies has not considered consumption taxation,
to our knowledge. We are able to quantify the welfare gains from taxing consumption and
from commitment, as well as the potential welfare gains from implementing optimal time-
consistent policies compared to the existing tax system in the United States.
The model economy we consider is a standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with
endogenous labour supply and variable capital utilisation (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huff-
man, 1988, and many others). The government spends on public goods which households
value, has access to three types of taxes, capital and labour income taxes and consumption
taxes, but no lump-sum taxes, and has to balance its budget.
Our paper is at the intersection of two strands of the optimal taxation literature: (i)
Ramsey policies with consumption taxation, such as Coleman (2000), who quantifies the
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welfare gains from taxing consumption; and (ii) time-consistent policies without consumption
taxation. The latter strand of the literature finds that lack of commitment alters greatly the
characteristics of optimal policies and the resulting allocations. In a framework similar to
ours but with capital fully utilised, Klein, Krusell, and R´ıos-Rull (2008) find that when the
only tax base available to the government is capital income, which in their Markov-perfect
equilibrium is an inelastic source of fiscal revenues, the policy-maker sets the tax rate below
the confiscatory level. Martin (2010) studies a Markov-perfect equilibrium in which the
fiscal authority can simultaneously tax labour and capital income. He finds that the optimal
policy calls for taxing capital and subsidising labour when capital is fully utilised. With
endogenous capital utilisation, as in the present paper, he finds that optimal time-consistent
taxation involves almost equal tax rates on capital and labour income, which are close to the
existing tax rates in the United States. Debortoli and Nunes (2010) also establish the same
quantitative result.
Our results can be summarised as follows. If the policy-maker has access to all three types
of taxes and the tax rates are unrestricted, the first-best allocation can be implemented at
the steady state under full commitment, as long as private consumption is larger than labour
income. Given that the Ramsey policy achieves the first best, it is also time-consistent. In
other words, the solutions under Ramsey and Markov-perfect policy-making coincide at the
steady state. However, the tax policies include a large labour subsidy.
Then, we study the case where the government is prohibited from subsidising labour
income, as in Coleman (2000) and Correia (2010), because large labour subsidies are not
observed in real economies and would likely lead to misreporting of hours. In this case, the
Ramsey policy-maker taxes consumption at 22.3 percent at the steady state in our baseline
calibration, and sets labour and capital income taxes to zero. The time-consistent policy-
maker finances government spending mainly from taxing consumption as well, taxing it at
22.1 percent in our baseline calibration, and sets the capital income tax to 0.4 percent and
the labour income tax to zero. In order to compare our results with the literature, e.g. Martin
(2010) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010), we also analyse a scenario in which the policy-maker
can only tax income deriving from labour and capital. In this case, the time-consistent
policy-maker sets the labour income tax to 6.5 percent and the capital income tax to 19.8
percent at the steady state.
The intuition behind these results is the following. First, consider the case without
consumption taxation. With only labour and capital income taxation, the Ramsey planner
initially taxes capital at a high rate. Then the capital tax rate gradually approaches zero,
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while the labour income tax rate increases over time. The downward trend in the capital
income tax induces households to continuously postpone their consumption, while a labour
tax hike reduces labour supply contemporaneously, but raises it in any previous period.
The time-consistent policy-maker does not internalise the effects of taxes on private sector
decisions in earlier periods. This leads to dramatic differences of policies and allocations
between Ramsey and Markov-perfect governments.
On the contrary, with access to consumption taxation, a downward trend in the capital
tax would require an upward trend in the consumption tax to satisfy the government’s budget
constraint. This would counteract the saving incentive and lead to inefficiently low capital
accumulation. As a result, the capital income tax rate is low from the start, and the consump-
tion tax rate hardly varies over time or with the level of capital. Thus the time-inconsistency
features of policies under commitment are negligible when consumption is taxed optimally.
This is the key economic mechanism that drives the close similarity between Ramsey and
Markov-perfect policy equilibria. Note also that while both taxes cause an intratemporal
distortion, the capital income tax causes an intertemporal distortion as well in the long run,
since it distorts the Euler equation, while the consumption tax does not. Therefore, taxing
consumption turns out to be the less distortive way to raise fiscal revenue.
In terms of welfare-equivalent consumption, the welfare gains from taxing consumption are
2.77 (1.21) percent in the case of a Markov (Ramsey) policy-maker.1 This means that taxing
consumption generates much larger welfare gains under discretion than under commitment.
The gains from commitment are negligible with consumption taxation (0.0003 percent), while
they are substantial (2.01 percent) without. We also compute the welfare gain from adopting
the time-consistent tax system with consumption taxation proposed here over the existing
one in the United States. The welfare increase is equivalent to permanently increasing private
consumption by 7.744 percent. Without access to consumption taxation, the welfare gains
are 4.92 percent. In the case of a Ramsey policy-maker, the welfare gains are 7.745 and 7.06
percent with and without access to consumption taxation, respectively. Remarkably, we find
higher levels of welfare under discretion when the policy-maker has access to consumption
taxation than under commitment when the government can tax only labour and capital
income.
1We have computed these welfare gains in welfare-equivalent consumption units in the standard way,
taking into account transitions. In particular, we ask by how much private consumption would have to
increase at the Markov (Ramsey) steady state without consumption taxation, keeping leisure and public
consumption fixed, to yield the same lifetime utility to the household as the lifetime utility it gets from the
Markov (Ramsey) optimal policy with consumption taxation, starting with the level of capital of the Markov
(Ramsey) steady state without consumption taxation. We have computed other welfare gains mentioned in
this paragraph in a similar fashion.
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Finally, we analyse policies over the business cycle when the economy is hit by aggregate
productivity shocks. We find that with access to consumption taxation also the cyclical
properties of tax rates and allocations under a Ramsey and a time-consistent policy-maker
are remarkably similar. Further, private consumption, hours, public goods, and output all
vary less over the business cycle with consumption taxation than without. Hence, the policy-
maker can better stabilise the economy taxing consumption, which yields additional welfare
benefits.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the economic environment.
Section 3 sets up the fiscal policy problems, both (i) the Ramsey problem and (ii) the problem
of a Markov/time-consistent policy-maker. Afterwards, it characterises the solutions and
presents some analytical results. Section 4 contains our baseline quantitative results, both
in a deterministic and in a stochastic environment, as well as robustness checks. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
We consider a discrete-time Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with a representative house-
hold, a representative and perfectly-competitive firm, and a benevolent policy-maker. The
household decides on consumption and leisure and chooses a capital utilisation rate as well.
The firm maximises profits and uses capital services and labour as production inputs. The
policy-maker spends on public goods which yield utility to households, and raises revenue
via linear taxes on labour and capital income as well as on consumption. Lump-sum taxes
are not available. The government balances its budget in each period.
A few comments are in order about our main assumptions before describing the economic
environment in detail. First, endogenous capital utilisation (see Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Huffman, 1988, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell, 2000, and many others) implies that
taxing capital is distortionary in the current period. This assumption is important to create
interesting and relevant trade-offs between the different tax instruments, see also Martin
(2010) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010). Further, it is an assumption which is in line with the
fact that capital is not fully utilised in reality and is standard in bigger Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. Second, we follow the literature on Markov-perfect
policies (Klein, Krusell, and Rı´os-Rull, 2008, and others) and consider government spending
to be a choice variable of the fiscal authority. At least part of government consumption can be
adjusted in response to changes in the economy, and we are interested in studying the optimal
policy mix both on the revenue and the spending side. However, we perform our analysis
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of comparing policy scenarios with exogenous government spending as well as a robustness
check, see Section 4.5.2. Finally, we exclude public debt dynamics for two main reasons.
First, again, we wish to compare our findings with previous studies on time-consistent fiscal
policies with capital accumulation, which also impose a balanced-budget requirement (Klein
and R´ıos-Rull, 2003; Ortigueira, 2006; Klein, Krusell, and R´ıos-Rull, 2008; Azzimonti, Sarte,
and Soares, 2009; Martin, 2010; Debortoli and Nunes, 2010). Second, in an RBC model with
variable capital utilisation, Ramsey policies can be made time consistent through public
debt restructuring (Zhu, 1995).2 Excluding public debt in models with capital accumulation
increases the time-inconsistency of Ramsey taxation, and allows us to better isolate the role
of consumption taxation.
Let at denote the level of aggregate productivity at time t, and let a
t = {a1, a2, ..., at}
denote the history of aggregate productivity realisations. The representative household takes
prices and policies as given and seeks to maximise
E0
[ ∞∑
t=1
βtu
(
c
(
at
)
, `
(
at
)
, g
(
at
))]
, (1)
where E0 represents the rational-expectations operator at time 0, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor, c (at) is private consumption when history at has occurred, ` (at) represents leisure,
and g (at) is public consumption; subject to the time constraint
h
(
at
)
+ `
(
at
)
= 1, ∀at, (2)
where h (at) represents hours worked given history at, and the budget constraint(
1 + τ c
(
at
))
c
(
at
)
+ k
(
at
)
=
(
1− τ k (at)) r (at) v (at) k (at−1)
+
(
1− τh (at))w (at)h (at)+ (1− δ (v (at))) k (at−1) , ∀at, (3)
where k (at−1) is the level of the capital stock at the beginning of the period, v (at) ∈ (0, 1] is
the capital utilisation rate, δ (v (at)) represents the depreciation rate as a function of capital
utilisation, and τ c (at), τh (at), and τ k (at) denote the consumption, the labour income, and
the capital income tax rate, respectively, given history at. Finally, the variables r (at) and
w (at) are the interest rate and the wage rate, respectively, and represent the remuneration of
production factors, namely, capital services and labour. The utility function u () is assumed
to be twice continuously differentiable in all three of its arguments with partial derivatives
2Domı´nguez (2007) establishes a similar result when there are delays in tax policy implementation, as in
Klein and R´ıos-Rull (2003).
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uc > 0, ucc < 0, u` > 0, u`` < 0, ug > 0, ugg < 0, where ux and uxx denote, respectively, the
first and the second derivative of the utility function with respect to the variable x.
Note that it is crucial that at least some true economic depreciation is not tax deductible,
else the current government would view the current capital tax as non-distortionary, and the
policy problem of the optimal time-consistent tax mix would reduce to a trivial exercise, see
Martin (2010) for further discussion. In reality the depreciation allowance does not depend
on the actual depreciation rate or the capital utilisation rate, instead it depends on the
accounting value of capital and a fixed depreciation rate determined by law. This means
that capital income taxation indeed distorts the capital utilisation margin and therefore is
distortionary within the period.3,4
Combining the first-order conditions with respect to consumption and leisure when history
at has occurred gives
u` (a
t)
uc (at)
=
1− τh (at)
1 + τ c (at)
w
(
at
)
. (4)
It is straightforward to derive a standard Euler equation,
uc (a
t)
1 + τ c (at)
= βEt
[
uc (a
t+1)
1 + τ c (at+1)
(
1− δ (v (at+1))+ (1− τ k (at+1)) v (at+1) r (at+1))] . (5)
The first-order condition with respect to v (at) is
δv
(
at
)
=
(
1− τ k (at)) r (at) . (6)
The optimal level of capital utilisation is where the marginal benefit from utilising more
capital in terms of after-tax income equals its marginal cost in terms of higher capital de-
preciation. Equation (6) implies that capital income taxation is distortionary within the
period.
Examining the household’s first-order conditions, the different distortions caused by the
three tax instruments become apparent. The labour income tax distorts the (intratemporal)
consumption-leisure margin, (4). The current consumption tax distorts the same margin.
In addition, both the current and next period’s consumption tax enters into the current
3We do not introduce the accounting value of capital into our model, as in Mertens and Ravn (2011) for
example, because not only we would have an additional endogenous state variable, but also the (forward-
looking) Euler equation would include all future capital utilisation and capital income tax rates on the right
hand side. Hence, recasting the problem into a recursive form and in turn solving it appear challenging.
4Instead of endogenous capital utilisation, Klein and R´ıos-Rull (2003) assume that the capital income tax
is chosen one or more periods in advance. In this way the current government internalises the distortive
effects of τk on future allocations. This approach, however, raises the question of why the capital income tax
would be set before other taxes. Note, however, that also in this case the Ramsey policy can be made time
consistent through debt restructuring, see Domı´nguez (2007).
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(forward-looking) Euler equation, (5). Finally, only next period’s capital income tax distorts
the current Euler equation, but the current capital income tax impacts the optimal capital
utilisation margin, (6). The task of the fiscal authority is to find the optimal tax mix to raise
revenue given these distortions.
We assume that the representative firm’s technology is of the standard Cobb-Douglas
form in capital services, v (at) k (at−1), and hours, h (at), i.e.,
y
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at
)
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(
at−1
)
, h
(
at
)
, at
)
= at
(
v
(
at
)
k
(
at−1
))γ
h
(
at
)1−γ
, ∀at, (7)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the capital-services elasticity of output. Denoting by fx the
derivative of the production function with respect to the variable x, optimal behaviour in
perfect competition implies
r
(
at
)
= fvk
(
at
)
= γat
(
h (at)
v (at) k (at−1)
)1−γ
, ∀at, (8)
w
(
at
)
= fh
(
at
)
= (1− γ) at,
(
v (at) k (at−1)
h (at)
)γ
, ∀at, (9)
i.e., production-factor prices equal their marginal products.
The resource constraint in this economy is
c
(
at
)
+ g
(
at
)
+ k
(
at
)
= y
(
at
)
+
(
1− δ (v (at))) k (at−1) , ∀at, (10)
where the initial level of capital, k (a0), is given. Finally, the government’s budget constraint
is
g
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at
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= τ k
(
at
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r
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v
(
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k
(
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+ τh
(
at
)
w
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)
h
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+ τ c
(
at
)
c
(
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)
, ∀at. (11)
The benchmark first-best equilibrium in our environment can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (First best). The first-best equilibrium consists of allocations
{g (at) , c (at) , ` (at) , h (at) , k (at) , v (at) , y (at)}∞t=1 that maximise (1) subject to household’s
time constraint, (2), the production function, (7), and the market clearing condition, (10),
∀at, k (a0) and the productivity process given.
The characterisation of first-best allocations is presented in Appendix A.
We can define competitive equilibria as follows.
Definition 2 (Competitive equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium consists of government
policies,
{
τh (at) , τ k (at) , τ c (at) , g (at)
}∞
t=1
, prices, {w (at) , r (at)}∞t=1, and private sector al-
locations, {c (at) , ` (at) , h (at) , k (at) , v (at) , y (at)}∞t=1, satisfying, ∀at,
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(i) private sector optimisation taking government policies and prices as given, that is,
- the household’s time constraint, (2), budget constraint, (3), and optimality conditions,
(4), (5), and (6);
- the production function, (7), and the firm’s optimality conditions, (8) and (9);
(ii) market clearing, (10), and
(iii) the government’s budget constraint, (11),
k (a0) and the productivity process given.
We can eliminate three variables, output (y (at)) and prices (w (at), and r (at)), and
three equations, (7), (8), and (9), in the definition of competitive equilibria. Further, the
government’s budget constraint and the resource constraint jointly imply that the household’s
budget constraint holds. We are then left with the following six conditions which characterise
competitive equilibria: ∀at,
h
(
at
)
+ `
(
at
)
= 1, (12)
u` (a
t)
uc (at)
=
1− τh (at)
1 + τ c (at)
at (1− γ)
(
v (at) k (at−1)
h (at)
)γ
, (13)
uc (a
t)
1 + τ c (at)
= βEt
[
uc (a
t+1)
1 + τ c (at+1)
(
1− δ (v (at+1))
+
(
1− τ k (at+1)) at+1γv (at+1)( h (at+1)
v (at+1) k (at)
)1−γ)]
, (14)
δv
(
at
)
=
(
1− τ k (at)) atγ ( h (at)
v (at) k (at−1)
)1−γ
, (15)
g
(
at
)
= at
(
τ k
(
at
)
γ + τh
(
at
)
(1− γ)) (v (at) k (at−1))γ h (at)1−γ + τ c (at) c (at) , (16)
c
(
at
)
+ g
(
at
)
+ k
(
at
)
= at
(
v
(
at
)
k
(
at−1
))γ
h
(
at
)1−γ
+
(
1− δ (v (at))) k (at−1) . (17)
3 The policy problems
We consider two types of policy equilibria: with and without commitment of the policy-
maker, i.e., Ramsey and Markov equilibria, respectively. In both cases the policy-maker
maximises the household’s lifetime utility over competitive equilibria. We assume, following
most of the literature, that the policy-maker moves first in each period.
We use a version of the primal approach, i.e., we write the policy problems in terms of
allocations rather than tax rates. However, we keep the consumption tax rate as a decision
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variable along with the allocations. This will be useful when we want to constrain the tax
rates.5 In order to do this, we use the household’s intratemporal optimality condition (13),
and the government’s budget constraint, (16), to express the labour and capital income tax
rates when history at has occured, respectively, as
τh
(
at
)
= 1− u` (a
t)
uc (at)
1 + τ c (at)
(1− γ) at
(
v(at)k(at−1)
h(at)
)γ , (18)
τ k
(
at
)
=
g (at)− τ c (at) c (at)
γat (v (at) k (at−1))
γ h (at)1−γ
− 1− γ
γ
τh
(
at
)
. (19)
Replacing for
(
1− τ k (at+1)) in (14) using (19) and in turn for τh (at+1) using (18), we have
uc (a
t)
1 + τ c (at)
= βEt
[
uc (a
t+1)
1 + τ c (at+1)
(
1− δ (v (at+1))+ at+1v (at+1)( h (at+1)
v (at+1) k (at)
)1−γ
−g (a
t+1)− τ c (at+1) c (at+1)
k (at)
)
− u`
(
at+1
) h (at+1)
k (at)
]
. (20)
Similarly, we can eliminate τ k (at) from (15) and rewrite it as
δv
(
at
)
= at
(
h (at)
v (at) k (at−1)
)1−γ
− g (a
t)− τ c (at) c (at)
v (at) k (at−1)
− u` (a
t)
uc (at)
(
1 + τ c
(
at
)) h (at)
v (at) k (at−1)
.
(21)
So far we have not imposed any restrictions on the tax rates. We are also interested in
the case where the labour income tax rate has to be non-negative, as in Coleman (2000)
and Correia (2010), given that in reality a labour subsidy is not observed at the aggregate
level. Further, a (large) subsidy would likely lead to misreporting of hours. To impose the
restriction τh (at) ≥ 0, we impose
u` (a
t)
uc (at)
≤ 1
1 + τ c (at)
(1− γ) at
(
v (at) k (at−1)
h (at)
)γ
. (22)
Below we write the policy problems in a general form including the constraint (22). We
will, however, also study the case where (22) is ignored and the case without consumption
taxation, i.e., τ c (at) = 0, ∀at, to compare our results with the existing literature.
3.1 The Ramsey policy-maker’s problem
The Ramsey policy-maker maximises (1) choosing the consumption tax rates {τ c (at)}∞t=0
and allocations {g (at) , c (at) , ` (at) , h (at) , k (at) , v (at)}∞t=0, subject to (12), (17), (20), (21),
5The same approach is used in Coleman (2000).
10
and (22), k (a0) and the productivity process given. We assign the Lagrange multipliers
λ1 (a
t) , ..., λ5 (a
t) to the five constraints, respectively.
Note that future decision variables enter into the household’s current Euler equation,
(20), hence the Ramsey problem is not recursive using only the natural state variables, a and
k. Following Marcet and Marimon (2011), the Lagrange multiplier on the Euler equation,
λ3 (a
t), with λ3 (a
0) = 0, can be introduced as a co-state variable to write a Bellman equation.
The Ramsey problem can then be solved numerically by standard policy function iteration.
The value function and the policy functions are time-invariant on the extended state
space, the current value of which is denoted (a, k, λ3). Next period’s productivity a
′ is
given exogenously. The policy-maker chooses the functions K′() and Λ′3(), as well the policy
functions for the control variables, i.e., T c(), C(), L (), H(), G(), V(), Λ′1(), Λ′2(), Λ′4(), and
Λ′5(), and the value function W().
Suppose that the current state is
(
a˜, k˜, λ˜3
)
, and let unindexed variables denote the values
of the policy functions for the control variables at this state, i.e., c = C
(
a˜, k˜, λ˜3
)
, and so on;
and k′ = K′
(
a˜, k˜, λ˜3
)
, λ′3 = Λ
′
3
(
a˜, k˜, λ˜3
)
, and W =W
(
a˜, k˜, λ˜3
)
. Then we can write
W = max
{τc,c,`,h,g,k′,v}
min
{λ1,λ2,λ′3,λ4,λ5}
u (c, `, g) + β
∑
a′
Pr (a′ | a)W (a′, k′, λ′3)
− λ1 (`+ h− 1)− λ2
(
c+ g + k′ − a (vk)γ h1−γ − (1− δ (v)) k)
+ λ′3
uc
1 + τ c
− λ3
[
uc
1 + τ c
(
1− δ (v) + av
(
h
vk
)1−γ
− g − τ
cc
k
)
− u`h
k
]
− λ4
(
a
(
h
vk
)1−γ
− g − τ
cc
vk
− u`
uc
(1 + τ c)
h
vk
− δv
)
− λ5
(
u`
uc
− 1
1 + τ c
a (1− γ)
(
vk
h
)γ)
,
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, and λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness conditions. It is obvious that the
time constraint, (12), and the resource constraint, (17), will bind. Hence, λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0.
Appendix B.1 presents the first-order conditions of the Ramsey policy-maker’s problem.
The solution of such a Ramsey problem is typically time inconsistent. It is optimal to
tax capital in the early periods of the reform, and it is also optimal to promise not to do the
same in future periods. Next, we take into account the government’s commitment problem.
3.2 The time-consistent policy-maker’s problem
To characterise optimal time-consistent policies, it is convenient to assume that there is
an infinite sequence of separate policy-makers, one for each period. The optimal policy
problem therefore resembles a dynamic game between the private sector and all successive
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governments. The current policy-maker seeks to maximise social welfare from today onwards,
anticipating how future policies depend on current policies via the inherited state variables.
She also takes into account the optimising behaviour of the private sector. Note that, as
under Ramsey policy-making, the fiscal authority moves first in every period, and commits
within the period.6
Without commitment, strategies for government spending and tax rates depend only
on the current natural state of the economy, (a, k). We restrict our attention to station-
ary Markov-perfect equilibria of the policy game, following the literature (Klein, Krusell,
and Rı´os-Rull, 2008, for example). In a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium, all govern-
ments employ the same policy rules. Hence, the rules must satisfy a fixed-point property:
if the current policy-maker anticipates that all future governments will follow the policy
rules {T c (a, k) , C (a, k) ,L (a, k) ,H (a, k) ,G (a, k) ,V (a, k) ,K′ (a, k)}, and similar rules for
the Lagrange multipliers, she find it optimal to follow the same rules. Abusing notation, all
these policy functions now have two arguments.
Suppose that the current state is
(
a˜, k˜
)
, and let unindexed variables denote the values of
the policy functions for the control variables at this state, i.e., c = C
(
a˜, k˜
)
, and so on; and
k′ = K′
(
a˜, k˜
)
and W = W
(
a˜, k˜
)
. Further, let Uc() = uc (C(),L (),G()), and similarly for
U`(). Then we have
W = max
{τc,c,`,h,g,k′,v}
min
{λ1,λ2,λ3,λ4,λ5}
u (c, `, g) + βEW (a′, k′)
− λ1 (`+ h− 1)− λ2
(
c+ g + k′ − a (vk)γ h1−γ − (1− δ (v)) k)
− λ3
{
− uc
1 + τ c
+ βE
[
Uc (a′, k′)
1 + T c (a′, k′)
(
1− δ (V (a′, k′)) + a′H (a
′, k′)1−γ V (a′, k′)γ k′γ
k′
−G (a
′, k′)− T c (a′, k′) C (a′, k′)
k′
)
− U` (a′, k′) H (a
′, k′)
k′
]}
− λ4
(
a
(
h
vk
)1−γ
− g − τ
cc
vk
− u`
uc
(1 + τ c)
h
vk
− δv
)
− λ5
(
u`
uc
− 1
1 + τ c
(1− γ) a
(
vk
h
)γ)
,
λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness condition. Appendix B.2 presents the first-order
conditions of the time-consistent policy-maker’s problem.
3.3 Some analytical results
We present results for both unrestricted tax rates and excluding a labour subsidy, and both
types of policy-makers, committed (Ramsey) and time-consistent (Markov). We consider an
6See Ortigueira (2006) on the importance of the assumption on the intra-temporal timing of actions.
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economy without productivity shocks here, i.e., we set at = 1, ∀t.
Let us first discuss some benchmark results. Consider a model in which capital utilisation
is fixed and exogenous, e.g. v = 1, and where the government has access to labour income,
capital income, and consumption taxation. In this case, the Ramsey policy-maker can im-
plement the first-best allocation. This is because she is only constrained by the technological
constraints, i.e., the time constraint, (12), and the resource constraint, (17), because the
current consumption tax rate can be chosen to satisfy the household’s Euler equation, (14).
It is well known that when a Ramsey equilibrium attains the first best, it is time-consistent:
if the planner were given an opportunity to revise her policies in the future, she would choose
not to do so. Note, however, that it is not clear whether the tax rates that implement the
first best are reasonable, i.e., positive and non-confiscatory.
In the case where households choose the capital utilisation rate, the above result clearly
cannot hold generically, given that the policy-maker has to satisfy an additional incentive
constraint, (15), while she has no more instruments. However, we can show that she can still
implement the first-best steady state. We can also determine some qualitative features of the
tax rates at the steady state.7
Proposition 1. As long as private consumption is larger than labour income, the first-best
steady state is a Ramsey steady state with τ c > 0, τh = −τ c, and τ k = 0, hence it is
time-consistent.
Proof. In Appendix C.1.
It might seem logical that if instead labour income is larger than private consumption,
a similar result holds with τh > 0, τ c = −τh, and τ k = 0. Indeed, this set of tax rates
would not distort any of the private sectors first-order conditions. However, the required tax
rates are larger than 100 percent in absolute value given the relatively small difference of
the tax bases for different measures of consumption and labour income in reality, see further
our quantitative analysis below. Neither a labour income tax rate above 100 percent, nor
a consumption tax rate below -100 percent is feasible. Therefore, in this case the first-best
steady state typically cannot be decentralised.8 Coleman (2000) discusses this case as well
and reaches the same conclusion.
7Here we are assuming (i) convergence of the allocations to an interior steady state and (ii) convergence of
the Lagrangian multipliers. As discussed in Lansing (1999) and Straub and Werning (2014), these assumptions
are not innocuous. However, in a representative-agent framework with intertemporally-separable utility, these
assumptions can be verified to hold, see Straub and Werning (2014). Note also that when solving the model
numerically, we do not rely on these assumptions.
8We have computed a case where the consumption-labour income ratio is 0.975 at the first best. The
consumption tax rate should be -936.47 percent in this case. Imposing a lower bound of -100 percent, we
find that the policy-maker sets a positive consumption tax and a negative labour income tax.
13
We now turn to the cases where tax rates are restricted.
Proposition 2. When τh ≥ 0 is imposed, the Ramsey policy-maker taxes only consumption
at the steady state.
Proof. In Appendix C.2.
Similarly, we can show in our environment that if we exclude consumption taxation, only
labour income is taxed at the steady state.
4 Quantitative analysis
We now turn to numerical methods to find the optimal fiscal policy mix quantitatively with
and without consumption taxation and with and without commitment. We will also quantify
the welfare gains from commitment with and without consumption taxation, as well as the
welfare gains from taxing consumption with and without commitment.
4.1 Calibration
In order to see how the allocations and tax rates behave quantitatively, we solve a calibrated
version of our economy. We have to make some further assumptions up front. We consider
the model period to be a year. We specify the utility function as
u (c, `, g) = log(c)− α` (1− `)
1+1/ϕ
1 + 1/ϕ
+ αg log(g), (23)
where ϕ is the (constant) Frisch elasticity of labour supply, while α` and αg are the weights of
leisure and public goods relative to private consumption, respectively. Given an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution equal to 1, we set the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, ϕ, equal
to 3, as in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).9 We assume that the depreciation rate is an increasing
and convex function of capital utilisation, following the literature. That is, δ(v) = ηvχ, with
η > 0 and χ > 1. Finally, we assume that aggregate productivity follows an AR(1) process
with persistence parameter ρ and standard deviation of the shock σa.
There remain 8 parameters to calibrate. We first pin down 5 of them, β, γ, α`, η, and χ, in
the following way. We use the private sector’s first-order conditions at steady state to match
average macroeconomic ratios from United States data for the period 1996-2010. We choose
this relatively short time period to better proxy current ‘steady-state’ macro ratios, as some,
9The micro and macro literature tend to differ on the estimates of the Frisch elasticity. Here, we follow
the macroeconomic literature and choose a relatively large Frisch elasticity. In Section 4.5.1, we check the
robustness of our results to a wide range of values of ϕ.
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notably the labour income share, have changed substantially over time. We take average
capacity utilisation for all industries from the Federal Reserve Board, and we compute all
other macro ratios using data provided by Trabandt and Uhlig (2012).10 The private sector
takes as given average effective tax rates. We do not take a stand on how the actual tax rates
were chosen by the government. We use the effective tax rates computed by Trabandt and
Uhlig (2012) for each year to find average tax rates of τh = 0.221, τ c = 0.045, and τ kδ = 0.410,
where the lower index δ means that this capital tax rate is with depreciation allowance.11
We choose γ = 0.391 to match an average labour income share of 60.9 percent. To
calibrate the parameters α`, η, χ, and β we first use the macro ratios c/y = 0.696,
12 g/y = 0.155,
and k/y = 2.349, and the steady-state resource constraint,
c
y
+
g
y
+ ηvχ
k
y
= 1, (24)
to find δ(v) = ηvχ = 0.064. Second, we convert τ kδ to a without-depreciation-allowance capital
tax rate keeping tax revenue constant, i.e., we assume that τ kδ (rv − δ(v)) = τ krv = τ kγ yvk .
This gives τ k = 0.253. Third, we choose α` to match h = 0.249, the fraction of time
worked for the working age population,13 using the consumption-leisure first-order condition
rewritten as
α`h
1
ϕ
c
y
=
1− τh
1 + τ c
1
h
.
This gives α` = 4.154. Fourth, we use the Euler equation,
1
β
= 1− ηvχ + (1− τ k) vr,
to find β = 0.943.14 Fifth, multiplying the optimality condition for capital utilisation, (15),
at steady state by v, we have
χηvχ =
(
1− τ k) vr.
Using v = 0.786 this gives χ = 1.956. Then, from ηvχ = 0.064, η = 0.102.
The 6th parameter to calibrate is αg. For our benchmark calibration we assume that g
found in the data is optimally chosen in the sense that uc = ug. Then we can use the macro
10https://sites.google.com/site/mathiastrabandt/home/downloads/LafferNberDataMatlabCode.zip
11We convert it to a capital tax rate without depreciation allowance, in line with our model, taking revenue
from capital income taxation as given, see below.
12In order to properly account for the different tax bases, our definition of consumption includes all products
and services that are subject to VAT, i.e., non-durables, durables, and services. This is in line with Coleman
(2000). However, we also consider the alternative assumption of assigning durables to investment as a
robustness check, see Section 4.5.3.
13Hours to be allocated between work and leisure: 13.64.
14The discount factor is lower than those typically used in the macro literature because of a higher c/y
ratio, see above. In Section 4.5 we show that all our results are robust to increasing β to 0.96.
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ratios c/y = 0.696 and g/y = 0.155 again to find αg = 0.223. Below we verify that our results
are not sensitive to the choice of this parameter.
Note that we have not taken into account the household’s and the government’s budget
constraint. This is because in reality tax revenues are raised not only to finance public
consumption, but also in order to redistribute resources from richer to poorer households.
At the status-quo steady state, tax revenues are higher by 11.7 percent of GDP than public
consumption. In order to satisfy the budget constraints, one can imagine that the government
gives a lump-sum transfer of 11.7 percent of GDP to the representative household.15
Finally, we calibrate the last two parameters, the AR(1) coefficients of the technological
progress, i.e., ρ and σa. We match the unconditional persistence and standard deviation of
total output in our economy with fixed tax rates to those of the de-trended US GDP for the
period 1996− 2010. As a result, we set ρ = 0.619 and σa = 0.020. Note that while the value
of the persistence parameter is lower than usual in the RBC literature as a whole, it is in line
with calibrated RBC models with variable capital utilisation such as Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Krusell (2000).
The calibrated parameter values are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Par Value Description
ϕ 3 Frisch elasticity
β 0.943 Discount factor
α` 4.154 Weight of leisure
αg 0.223 Weight of public goods
γ 0.391 Capital elasticity
η 0.102
Depreciation parameters, δ(v) = ηvχ
χ 1.956
ρ 0.619 Technology shock autoregressive parameter
σa 0.020 Technology shock standard deviation
4.2 Solution method
Our solution method is the following. We use a standard policy-function-iteration algorithm
to solve the Ramsey problem. This consists of the following steps. First, we discretise the
state variables k ∈ [k, k] and λ3 ∈ [λ3, λ3] in the deterministic case, and a as well in the
stochastic case. For the latter, we approximate the estimated AR(1) process by a 3-state
15Viewed through the lens of a representative-agent model, this is a source of inefficiency. This will imply
additional welfare gains for all optimal tax reforms we consider.
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Markov chain following Tauchen (1986).16 Once we have found the endogenous collocation
nodes, we guess the policy functions at each grid point. At each iteration we solve the system
of non-linear equations at each grid point, and we approximate globally the policy functions
of next period via cubic spline collocation method. We iterate till convergence of the policy
functions is obtained at each grid point to high accuracy.
We solve the time-consistent policy-maker’s problem by policy-function iteration as well.
In order to compute the derivatives of next period’s policy functions with respect to the
endogenous state k′, we parameterise the policy functions at each endogenous collocation
node.17 We iterate until the policies at each grid point converge to high accuracy. We verify
that the derivatives have converged as well. The resulting policy functions are well-behaved.
Therefore, we can conclude that our exercise is not plagued by numerical problems.18
4.3 Results in the deterministic case
We first present steady-state results. Note that in the cases of the first best and the con-
strained Ramsey, we can compute the steady state directly from the first-order conditions of
the policy problems and without solving for the dynamics. We can then verify that the num-
bers are identical to high precision once the dynamic policy problem is solved, as described
in the previous subsection. The Markov steady state can only be computed once the model
is fully solved.
Table 2 shows the allocations and the tax rates at steady state for five policy models. The
first column shows the case where the policy-maker has access to all three taxes and the tax
rates are unrestricted. Remember that here both Ramsey and Markov policies can implement
the first-best steady state. However, the tax rates seem unrealistic, with a consumption tax
of 324.5 percent and a labour income tax of -324.5 percent.
Columns 2 and 3 show the case where the government is prohibited from subsidising
labour income. In this case, the Ramsey policy-maker (Column 2) taxes consumption at
22.3 percent at the steady state and sets the labour and capital income taxes to zero.19 The
16The values for a are 0.980, 1, and 1.020, and the resulting transition probability matrix is
Π =
 0.649 0.302 0.0490.262 0.476 0.262
0.049 0.302 0.649
 .
17The derivatives of next period’s policy functions are computed using the Compecon Matlab package by
Fackler and Miranda (2004).
18In Section 4.5.4 we verify that our results are robust to using different solution algorithms.
19Note that the fact that the Ramsey policy-maker sets the consumption tax rate equal to αg when τ
h ≥ 0
is imposed is a consequence of logarithmic sub-utilities for both private and government consumption.
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Table 2: Tax rates and allocations at steady state
unrestricted τh ≥ 0 τ c = 0
Variable Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.223 0.221 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.065
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.198
Capital 1.801 1.548 1.539 1.467 1.106
Capital utilisation 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786
Depreciation rate 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064
Hours worked 0.320 0.275 0.277 0.261 0.283
Income 0.572 0.492 0.491 0.466 0.439
Capital-income ratio 3.146 3.146 3.133 3.146 2.523
Consumption 0.375 0.322 0.322 0.305 0.317
Consumption-income ratio 0.654 0.654 0.652 0.654 0.723
Public spending 0.084 0.072 0.072 0.068 0.051
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.117
Per-period utility -2.234 -2.271 -2.293 -2.318 -2.403
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.059 0.061 0.087 0.184
time-consistent policy-maker (Column 3) finances government spending mainly from taxing
consumption as well, taxing it at 22.1 percent, and sets the capital income tax to 0.4 percent
and the labour income tax to zero. Once a labour subsidy is ruled out, it is inefficient to tax
both labour and consumption as both taxes distort the same margin, the consumption-leisure
decision of the household. Optimal policy generally calls for using the less distortive tax (here
the consumption tax) and sets the other (here the labour income tax) to zero. On this point,
it is important to stress that there are several reasons for which taxing consumption is less
distortive than taxing labour, and the result does not hinge on consumption being larger
than labour income. The Laffer curve of the consumption tax peaks at infinity. This means
that the loss of efficiency that this tax brings about is always less than proportional to its
increase. This is not the case for the labour income tax, as its Laffer curve always peaks for
τh ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, as formally proved in Correia (2010), any revenue-neutral policy that
increases consumption taxation and decreases labour income tax, the latter constrained to
be non-negative, increases efficiency and therefore welfare.
Without consumption taxation, the Ramsey policy-maker (Column 4) taxes only labour
income at the steady state, as is well known, while the time-consistent policy-maker (Col-
umn 5) sets the labour income tax to 6.5 percent and the capital income tax to 19.8 percent.
Hence, the most striking feature of tax rates at steady state is that with consumption taxa-
tion the Ramsey and Markov policies and allocations are very similar, unlike with only labour
and capital income taxation.
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Turning now to the allocations at steady state, note first that the consumption-income
ratio and the public spending-income ratio are the same at the first best and at the Ramsey
steady states. This is due to log utility, see Motta and Rossi (2014). Without consumption
taxation, the time-consistent policies imply a significantly lower long-run capital-income ratio,
a higher consumption-income ratio, a lower public spending-income ratio compared to the
Ramsey case, which are all due to more distortions caused by taxation. The result that the
public spending-income ratio is lower under Markov policy was first noted by Klein, Krusell,
and R´ıos-Rull (2008) in an environment where only labour income taxes are available. Here
we show that the same result holds in a scenario with both capital and labour income taxes.
Finally, hours worked are higher under discretion than under commitment, because of the
lower labour income tax.
Instead, with consumption taxation, as a result of less distortion caused by the need to
raise fiscal revenue, the steady-state level of capital and income are higher. Notably, they are
higher without commitment but with consumption taxation than under Ramsey policy but
taxing only labour and capital income. Further, while it is still true that the capital- and
public spending-income ratios are lower and the consumption-income ratio is higher under
Markov than under Ramsey policies, all ratios change very little as a result of the change in
commitment.
Table 2 also shows the per-period utilities and the welfare-equivalent consumption losses
compared to the first best at the steady state in the different taxation and commitment
scenarios.20 With access to consumption taxation but imposing a non-negativity constraint
on the labour income tax rate, the steady-state welfare losses amount to 6.1 percent in the case
of time-consistent policy and to 5.9 percent in the case of Ramsey policy-making. Without
taxing consumption, the steady-state welfare-equivalent consumption loss is 18.4 percent
under Markov-perfect policy and 8.7 percent under Ramsey policy. Three results are worth
stressing. First, taxing consumption generates larger welfare gains under discretion (66.9
percent) than under commitment (32.6 percent). Second, the welfare gains from commitment
are small with consumption taxation (2.9 percent) and large without consumption taxation
(52.4 percent). Third, welfare is higher without commitment but with access to consumption
taxation than with commitment but taxing only labour and capital income.
Next, we study whether our main results on the usefulness of consumption taxation in
terms of mitigating the commitment problem of the policy-maker and improving welfare hold
20That is, we compute by what fraction the steady-state level of private consumption should be increased,
keeping hours worked and public consumption constant, for the representative household to be as well off as
at the first-best steady state.
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once we take into account policy dynamics. We also want to quantify the welfare gains from
commitment taking into account the transition with and without consumption taxation. In
order to do this, we perform the following policy exercise. We assume that initially the
economy is at the Markov steady state. At time zero a new policy-maker enters into office.
She can either be a Markov policy-maker, in which case the same policies and allocations will
be implemented in all periods, or have access to a commitment technology, in which case the
economy will converge to the Ramsey steady state. Figures 1 and 2 show the dynamics of
the allocations and the tax rates when the policy-maker does not have access to consumption
taxation and when consumption is taxed optimally but labour income cannot be subsidised,
respectively.
Consider first the case with only labour and capital income taxation. At time 0, the
Ramsey policy-maker sets capital taxes positive, since capital is a relatively inelastic tax
base. However, as discussed above, capital income taxes distort the intratemporal margin of
capital utilisation, hence it is sub-optimal to tax capital income at a very high rate in period 0.
During the transition, capital income taxes converge to zero. By reducing the capital income
tax in any period t, the policy-maker positively affects capital accumulation in all previous
periods, i.e., the downward trend in τ k induces the household to continuously postpone her
consumption. At the same time, the Ramsey planner increases the labour income tax rate.
This tax hike reduces labour supply in period t, but raises it in any previous period. Along
the transition, capital, consumption, and government spending increase, while hours worked
decrease.
On the other hand, the Markov policy-maker considers choices made at time t not to affect
the private sector’s behaviour in any previous period. This means that she does not internalise
the benefits of a tax hike on labour income and a reduction in the capital income tax rate in
terms of allocations in earlier periods. Furthermore, given the presence of endogenous capital
utilisation and labour supply, both labour and capital income taxes are distortive within the
period, while the capital tax distorts the Euler equation as well. In an attempt to minimise
distortions the Markov policy-maker taxes both capital and labour income in the long run.
In our baseline calibration, the long-run level of τ k is approximately three times higher than
τh. However, the relative magnitude of the tax rates hinges on the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply, ϕ, which is equal to 3 in our baseline calibration. With ϕ = 1 we recover the result
of the existing literature (Martin, 2010; Debortoli and Nunes, 2010) that the two income tax
rates are close to equal at the Markov steady state, see Section 4.5.1.
The possibility of taxing consumption changes markedly the features of optimal policy.
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Under commitment, the policy-maker sets the consumption tax rate positive and almost
constant, avoids taxing labour income, and taxes capital income only initially, and even then
at a very low rate. The policy-maker does not promise a tax hike on τ c as doing so would
be equivalent, via the Euler equation, to an increase in τ k in the following period. This is
suboptimal as the household would anticipate her consumption, leading to inefficiently low
capital accumulation. Ceteris paribus, it is also suboptimal for the policy-maker to commit
to a downward trend in τ c, as this would provide an incentive to the household to inefficiently
increase labour supply during the transition. These two effects keep consumption taxes close
to constant along the transition.
Given the low incentive to tax capital in the initial period, the time-inconsistency feature
of Ramsey policies under consumption taxation is very limited compared to the standard
case where the fiscal authority has access to labour and capital income taxation only. As
a result, the tax policy functions under commitment and discretion are remarkably similar.
Firstly, under Markov policy-making as well, it is suboptimal to jointly tax labour and
consumption as these two taxes impact on the same intratemporal margin. Therefore, in the
discretionary equilibrium as well, the labour income tax is zero at all times. Secondly, the
Markov policy-maker recognises that present consumption taxation has a beneficial effect on
today’s saving rate. At the same time, taxing capital distorts capital utilisation and, unlike
a constant consumption tax, it also distorts the long-run Euler equation. In particular, by
depressing the current saving rate, it would limit the amount of resources available in the
future. Therefore, despite capital being a relative inelastic source of revenue within the
period, the time-consistent policy-maker taxes mainly consumption. Given that this policy
is very similar to the one implemented by the Ramsey planner, the resulting time-consistent
allocations are also very close to the Ramsey ones along the transition as well.
Using our simulations, we can quantify the welfare gains from commitment both with
and without consumption taxation, starting from the corresponding Markov steady state.
We find that the welfare gains from commitment in terms of welfare-equivalent consumption
are 0.0003 percent with consumption taxation and 2.01 percent taxing labour income instead.
Hence, the gains from commitment are negligible with access to consumption taxation, while
they are substantial without.
We perform a similar calculation to quantify the gains from taxing consumption. First we
consider time-consistent policy-makers. We find that the welfare gains in terms of welfare-
equivalent consumption are 2.77 percent, taking into account the transition from the Markov
steady state without consumption taxation. Second, we perform the same calculation for a
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Ramsey policy-maker, starting from the Ramsey steady state without consumption taxation.
Now the welfare gains from taxing consumption are 1.21 percent. Hence, the welfare gains
from taxing consumption are much larger under discretion than under commitment.
Finally, we can also compute the welfare gains from the different taxation and commitment
scenarios compared to the existing tax system in a similar fashion. We assume that initially
the economy is at the actual steady state, described in Section 4.1. At time 0 a new policy-
maker enters into office. She can be either a Markov or a Ramsey policy-maker, and with
either access to consumption taxation or no access. In the case of a Ramsey policy-maker,
the welfare gains are 7.745 percent and 7.06 percent with and without taxing consumption,
respectively. Ceteris paribus, in the case of a Markov policy-maker, the welfare gains are
7.744 percent and 4.92 percent, respectively. Notice that the welfare gains are larger with
consumption taxation and without commitment than without consumption taxation and
with commitment. Table 3 summarises our welfare results including transitions.
Table 3: Welfare gains in welfare-equivalent consumption units (percent)
Welfare gains... With cons. tax Without cons. tax
...from commitment 0.0003 2.01
...compared to the existing tax system ...from taxing consumption
Ramsey 7.745 7.06 2.21
Markov 7.744 4.92 2.77
Figures 3 and 4 show the dynamics of the tax rates and the allocations without and
with access to consumption taxation, respectively, for both a Ramsey and a time-consistent
policy-maker. These pictures show what is behind the welfare-gain numbers compared to
the status quo. With access to consumption taxation, the whole dynamic path of taxes and
allocations hardly differ with and without commitment.
4.4 Results with aggregate productivity shocks
We now study the cyclical properties of the policy instruments and allocations under the
different tax and commitment scenarios. We are interested in whether the close similarity
between Ramsey and Markov policies when consumption is taxed optimally still holds when
the economy faces aggregate productivity shocks. For each policy scenario, we simulate the
model and calculate sample statistics from the simulated data.21 The results of this exercise
are reported in Table 4.
21We proceed as follows. We assume that in the initial period the system is in its stochastic steady state.
We simulate the model for 1000 periods, using the same shocks across policy scenarios, and compute sample
statistics. Finally, we take the median values of the sample statistics over 101 repetitions.
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Table 4: Cyclical properties of taxes and allocations
τh ≥ 0 τ c = 0
Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
Consumption tax Labour income tax
Mean 0.221 0.221 0.240 0.065
Standard deviation 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002
Coefficient of variation 0.024 0.022 0.009 0.030
Autocorrelation 0.590 0.621 0.922 0.494
Correlation with output 0.9998 0.996 -0.700 -0.860
Capital income tax
Mean 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.198
Standard deviation 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.004
Coefficient of variation 10.483 1.894 30.693 0.019
Autocorrelation 0.590 0.618 0.463 0.490
Correlation with output -0.9995 -0.997 -0.801 -0.913
Public spending
Mean 0.072 0.072 0.068 0.051
Standard deviation 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Coefficient of variation 0.015 0.015 0.019 0.022
Autocorrelation 0.974 0.976 0.775 0.799
Correlation with output 0.382 0.414 0.880 0.886
Public spending-income ratio
Mean 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.117
Standard deviation 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003
Coefficient of variation 0.031 0.030 0.026 0.023
Autocorrelation 0.508 0.511 0.514 0.490
Correlation with output -0.899 -0.898 -0.936 -0.892
Consumption
Mean 0.322 0.322 0.305 0.317
Standard deviation 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
Coefficient of variation 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.018
Autocorrelation 0.974 0.976 0.939 0.934
Correlation with output 0.382 0.414 0.621 0.665
Hours
Mean 0.275 0.276 0.260 0.283
Standard deviation 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
Coefficient of variation 0.021 0.020 0.027 0.025
Autocorrelation 0.512 0.515 0.513 0.490
Correlation with output 0.866 0.864 0.937 0.901
Output
Mean 0.493 0.492 0.467 0.439
Standard deviation 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.018
Coefficient of variation 0.034 0.033 0.042 0.040
Autocorrelation 0.585 0.588 0.570 0.578
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.059 0.061 0.087 0.183
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When consumption taxes are not available and the policy-maker can credibly commit
(Column 3), the burden of taxation is almost entirely given to labour taxation. At the same
time, labour income taxes hardly move in response to shocks, as the policy-maker prefers to
use capital income taxes and public expenditure as shock absorbers. This is the well-known
labour tax smoothing result of the Ramsey literature (Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1994).
On the other hand, under discretion (Column 4 of Table 4), the policy-maker uses both
capital and labour income taxes in response to unexpected productivity changes. The co-
efficient of variation of the labour income tax rate is more than three times larger and the
coefficient of variation of the capital income tax rate is more than a thousand times smaller
than their Ramsey counterparts. This is mainly due to the fact that the Markov policy-maker
is less able to smooth the effects of random productivity events intertemporally, as she is less
able to use the capital income tax as shock absorber, given that she relies heavily on this
instrument to raise fiscal revenue. In our numerical example, the coefficient of variation of the
capital income tax rate is roughly three-fifths of the coefficient of variation of labour taxes.
Interestingly, the volatility of output and hours worked are slightly higher under commitment
than under discretion, while the opposite is true for private and public consumption. Finally,
both tax rates are countercyclical. These patterns are, for the most part, very similar to the
ones presented in Klein and R´ıos-Rull (2003) and in Debortoli and Nunes (2010), although
the class of economies they look at is slightly different.22
The differences between Ramsey and Markov policies are greatly reduced when the policy-
maker can tax consumption (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4). Hence, the close similarity
between Ramsey and Markov policy-making when consumption taxes are available extend to
the cyclical properties of taxes and allocations. As in the case without consumption taxation,
the coefficient of variation of capital income taxes is larger than that of the alternative tax
instrument, in this case, the consumption tax. However, under Markov policies capital taxes
still play the main role in absorbing shocks, unlike without consumption taxation. A new
feature of tax policies with consumption taxation is that the consumption tax rate is highly
procyclical. The capital income tax rate remains countercyclical, but its correlation with
output increases when consumption is taxed. All allocation variables, namely, consumption,
public spending, hours, and output vary less with consumption taxation than without.
Finally, we compute long-run expected welfare as a percentage increase in welfare-equivalent
consumption units in all periods and all states in a particular policy scenario that is neces-
22In particular, Klein and R´ıos-Rull (2003) study a model with full capital utilisation, exogenous govern-
ment spending and a capital income tax which is determined one or more periods in advance, while Debortoli
and Nunes (2010) consider a utility function with variable Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
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sary to make the representative household as well off as at the first best.23 The values we
find are very similar to those for the deterministic steady state, and hence our main conclu-
sions extend to the stochastic environment, namely, that (i) taxing consumption generates
larger welfare gains under discretion than under commitment, and (ii) the welfare gains from
commitment are small with consumption taxation and large without consumption taxation.
Therefore, the business cycle results confirm the similarities between Ramsey and Markov
equilibria when the policy-maker has access to consumption taxation, as well as the welfare
benefits of taxing consumption.
4.5 Robustness checks
In this section we verify the robustness of our results to (i) changing some parameter values,
(ii) taking government spending as exogenous, (iii) recalibrating the model using another
definition of consumption from the data, in particular, we exclude durables, and (iv) solving
the models using different numerical algorithms.
4.5.1 Different parameters values
First of all, we consider a wide range of values for the Frisch elasticity of labour supply
without productivity shocks. In particular, we consider (i) ϕ = 0.4, which is in line with
recent micro estimates such as Domeij and Floden (2006) (see also Guner, Kaygusuz, and
Ventura, 2012), (ii) ϕ = 1, which is often chosen in the macro literature (e.g. Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005), and (iii) ϕ = 5 as a high value, which is sometimes chosen
to better match the intertemporal variation of aggregate hours (e.g. Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and
Valle´s, 2007). We adjust α` appropriately in each case as described in Section 4.1.
The first three panels of Table 5 show that the steady-state results are only marginally
affected by changing ϕ, except in the case of a time-consistent policy-maker without access
to consumption taxation (last column of Table 5). For all values of ϕ, the Ramsey planner
finances all public expenditure with either only labour income or only consumption taxation,
as we know from Proposition 2 and the existing literature. Under discretion, if consumption
taxation is available, the changes in tax rates are very small. On the other hand, we find
large differences when consumption taxes are not available. In that case, τh varies from 17.3
to 4.2 percent and τ k from 7.8 to 22.1 percent as ϕ increases. This is because increasing the
23In order to do this, for some percentage increase in consumption ε, we simulate the economy over 600
periods, compute per-period utility for the last 500 periods, and finally take the average over 501 such
simulations. Then we find the ε such that the average per-period utility matches the one found for the first
best from similar simulations.
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elasticity of labour supply increases the relative distortion of τh compared to τ k. As a result,
the optimal time-consistent policy calls for lower labour income tax rates and higher capital
income tax rates.
Increasing the Frisch elasticity increases the welfare losses under all policy scenarios.
This is because, ceteris paribus, a higher ϕ implies a stronger response of hours to any given
distortion of the consumption-leisure margin. It is also worth noticing that under discretion as
ϕ gets bigger, the public spending-income ratio decreases. This is because the Markov planner
chooses lower taxes as the distortionary effects of fiscal policy are greater. These effects are
almost absent in the case with consumption taxation. Increasing the Frisch elasticity does not
remove the policy-maker’s incentive to give almost all the burden of taxation to consumption
and to keep the public spending-income ratio close to its efficient level.
Afterwards, we increase the coefficient of relative risk aversion to 2, i.e., now the current
utility function is
u (c, `, g) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ − α`
(1− `)1+1/ϕ
1 + 1/ϕ
+ αg
g1−σ − 1
1− σ ,
with σ = 2 and ϕ = 3. We recalibrate the utility weights α` = 16.791 and αg = 0.050 to
keep hours at 0.249 and g/y at 0.155 before the reform. The results are in the fourth panel of
Table 5. Our conclusions remain unaltered.
In the fifth panel of Table 5, we report the steady-state results for the case where we keep
σ = 1 and ϕ = 3 but set β = 0.96, the most-commonly used value in the macro literature
for yearly models. Again our results are not affected.
Next, we set χ = 1.8 and adjust η = 0.098 so that the capital utilisation rate at the
steady state be the same as in the data. Note that this implies a depreciation rate of 0.076
at the steady state. Panel 6 of Table 5 shows that our conclusions do not change.
We also consider a higher value of αg, 0.3 in particular, while keeping all other parameters
at their baseline values. In this case the consumption tax base is smaller as a share of GDP
than in the baseline calibration. The results are in Panel 7 of Table 5. Ramsey and Markov
policies and allocations are very similar with consumption taxation in this case as well.
Remarkably, under all parameterisations considered, taxing consumption is more impor-
tant than being able to commit. As reported in Tables 2 and 5, welfare is always higher
under Markov policy-making and consumption taxation than under Ramsey without taxing
consumption.
We solve the stochastic model as well with ϕ = 1 to check the robustness of the cycli-
cal properties of tax rates and allocations. Table 6 shows that the main features remain
unchanged.
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4.5.2 Exogenous government spending
This section shows that our results do not change if we consider government spending to be
exogenous. The new policy problem consists of raising fiscal revenues in order to finance an
exogenous and fixed level of public consumption, g¯. The government budget constraint can
now be written as
g¯ = τ k
(
at
)
r
(
at
)
v
(
at
)
k
(
at−1
)
+ τh
(
at
)
w
(
at
)
h
(
at
)
+ τ c
(
at
)
c
(
at
)
, ∀at. (25)
We further assume that households do not value government spending, i.e.
E0
[ ∞∑
t=1
βtu
(
c
(
at
)
, `
(
at
))]
. (26)
We calibrate g¯ so that g¯/y in the decentralised competitive steady-state, taking tax rates as
given, is equal to its value in the data, 0.155. Then we keep g¯ constant across all policy
regimes. All other parameters are kept at their benchmark values as described in Section 4.1.
The steady-state results of this exercise are reported in Table 7. The close similarity of
Ramsey and Markov fiscal policies and allocations when consumption is taxed optimally
holds in this case as well.
4.5.3 A different measure of consumption
We now consider durable consumption spending as part of investment rather than of con-
sumption. Let us denote by ic this investment. Then, instead of (24) we have
c
y
+
g
y
+
ic
y
+ ηvχ
k
y
= 1, (27)
with c/y = 0.633 and ic/y = 0.063. Note that the stock of consumer durables is by definition
not part of productive capital. We recalibrate our baseline model following the strategy
described in Section 4.1. Only two parameters of the current utility function change, in
particular, now α` = 4.668 and αg = 0.245. We present the steady-state results in Table 8.
Our main conclusions are robust to considering this alternative measure of consumption.
4.5.4 Different numerical algorithms
Finally, we also check the robustness of our results to using different numerical algorithms.
In particular, using the solution to the Ramsey problem by policy function iteration as initial
guess, we solve it again parameterising the policy functions using Chebyshev polynomials or
cubic splines. Then, we solve the time-consistent policy-maker’s problem by parameterising
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the policy functions again. In this solution algorithm we iterate until the parameters of
the policy functions converge to high accuracy. The resulting tax rates and allocations are
identical up to many decimals to the ones computed using policy function iteration.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied the properties of time-consistent optimal fiscal policies when the
policy-maker has access to consumption taxation, both in a deterministic setting and over
the business cycle. Contrary to the case with only labour and capital income taxation, time-
consistent policies, and hence allocations, are very close to those under Ramsey policy, as
long as capital income taxation causes some distortion within the period. This also means
that the Ramsey policies are close to time-consistent in the sense that if a new policy-maker
with the same objective entered in a randomly chosen period or due to the electoral cycle,
policies would hardly change.
When the labour income tax rate is restricted to be non-negative, the optimal time-
consistent capital income tax rate is close to zero (0.4 percent), the consumption tax rate
is 22.1 percent, and labour income is not taxed at the steady state. The proposed time-
consistent policies with consumption taxation would yield welfare gains of 7.744 percent in
terms of welfare-equivalent consumption units compared to the existing tax system, taking
into account the transition. These welfare gains are almost as large as under commitment
(7.745 percent), and are larger than the gains a Ramsey policy-maker could achieve without
access to consumption taxation (7.06 percent). If the time-consistent policy maker can only
tax labour and capital income, the welfare gains are reduced to 4.92 percent.
In this paper we have considered a representative-agent framework, hence we studied the
optimal tax mix from an efficiency perspective only, to raise fiscal revenues. An important
task for future research is to analyse the distributional impact of the different tax instruments
in a model with heterogeneity across households.
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Appendices
A First-best allocation
Denote by λ1 (a
t) the Lagrange multiplier on the time constraint, (2), and by λ2 (a
t) the
Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint, (10), when history at has occurred. Use (7)
to replace for y (at) in (10). Then we can write the problem as
max
{c(at),`(at),h(at),g(at),k(at),v(at)}∞t=1
min
{λ1(at),λ2(at)}∞t=1
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
c
(
at
)
, `
(
at
)
,
(
at
))
+λ1
(
at
) (
1− ` (at)− h (at))
+λ2
(
at
) (
at
(
v
(
at
)
k
(
at−1
))γ
h
(
at
)1−γ
+
(
1− δ (v (at))) k (at−1)− c (at)− g (at)− k (at))]} ,
where we have used (7) to replace for y (at) in (10). The first-order conditions with respect
to c (at) , ` (at) , h (at) , g (at) , k (at) , v (at) , λ1 (a
t), and λ2 (a
t), respectively, are
uc
(
at
)
= λ2
(
at
)
, (28)
u`
(
at
)
= λ1
(
at
)
, (29)
at (1− γ)
(
v (at) k (at−1)
h (at)
)γ
= λ1
(
at
)
, (30)
ug
(
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)
= λ2
(
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)
, (31)
λ2
(
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)
= βEt
[
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at+1γv
(
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)γ (h (at+1)
k (at)
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δu
(
at
)
= atγ
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h (at)
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)
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(
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))γ
h
(
at
)1−γ
+
(
1− δ (v (at))) k (at−1) . (35)
Straightforward combinations of (28)-(35) lead to the following equations which characterise
the first-best allocation:
ug
(
at
)
= uc
(
at
)
, (36)
u` (a
t)
uc (at)
= at (1− γ)
(
v (at) k (at−1)
h (at)
)γ
, (37)
h
(
at
)
+ `
(
at
)
= 1, (38)
uc
(
at
)
= βEt
[
uc
(
at+1
)(
1− δ (v (at+1))+ at+1γv (at+1)( h (at+1)
v (at+1) k (at)
)1−γ)]
, (39)
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c
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(
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)
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(
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)
= at
(
v
(
at
)
k
(
at−1
))γ
h
(
at
)1−γ
+
(
1− δ (v (at))) k (at−1) , (40)
δv
(
at
)
= atγ
(
h (at)
v (at) k (at−1)
)1−γ
, (41)
∀at, k (a0) and the productivity process given.
B First-order conditions of the policy problems
We assume that the utility function is separable with respect to its three arguments, hence
the second cross-derivatives are zero.
B.1 First-order conditions of the Ramsey policy-maker’s problem
The FOCs with respect to τ c, c, `, h, g, k′, v, and λ1, λ2, λ′3, λ4, λ5, respectively, are
0 =
1
(1 + τ c)2
[
−λ′3uc + λ3uc
(
1− δ(v) + av
(
h
vk
)1−γ
− g − τ
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k
)
−λ5 (1− γ) a
(
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h
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c
vk
− u`
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h
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)
− λ3 uc
1 + τ c
c
k
, (42)
0 = uc − λ2 + λ′3
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λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness condition.
B.2 First-order conditions of the time-consistent policy-maker’s
problem
The FOCs with respect to τ c, c, `, h, g, k′, v, respectively, are
0 = −λ3 1
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Applying the envelope theorem gives
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′, k′)γ
k′1−γH (a′, k′)γ .
Plugging this condition into (59), we obtain
0 = −λ2 + βE
{
Λ2 (a
′, k′)
[
a′γV (a′, k′)γ
(H (a′, k′)
k′
)1−γ
+ 1− δ (V (a′, k′))
]
+Λ4 (a
′, k′)
(
a′ (1− γ)
(H (a′, k′)
V (a′, k′)
)1−γ
k′γ−2 − G (a
′, k′)− T c (a′, k′) C (a′, k′)
V (a′, k′) k′2
−U` (a
′, k′)
Uc (a′, k′) (1 + T
c (a′, k′))
H (a′, k′)
V (a′, k′) k′2
)
+ Λ5 (a
′, k′)
1
1 + T c (a′, k′)a
′ (1− γ) γ V (a
′, k′)γ
k′1−γH (a′, k′)γ
}
− βλ3E
{ Uc(a′,k′)
1+T c(a′,k′)
∂k′
[
1− δ (V (a′, k′)) 1
2
+ a′
H (a′, k′)1−γ V (a′, k′)γ k′γ
k′
− G (a
′, k′)
k′
+
T c (a′, k′) C (a′, k′)
k′
]
+
Uc (a′, k′)
1 + T c (a′, k′)
[
−∂δ (V (a
′, k′))
∂k′
+ a′
∂H(a
′,k′)1−γV(a′,k′)γk′γ
k′
∂k′
− ∂
G(a′,k′)
k′
∂k′
+
∂ T
c(a′,k′)C(a′,k′)
k′
∂k′
]
−∂U` (a
′, k′) H(a
′,k′)
k′
∂k′
}
. (61)
Finally, the first-order conditions with respect to λ1, λ2, λ3, λ5, and λ4, respectively, are
0 = `+ h− 1, (62)
0 = c+ g + k′ − a (vk)γ h1−γ − (1− δ (v)) k, (63)
0 = − uc
1 + τ c
+ βE
[
Uc (a′, k′)
1 + T c (a′, k′)
(
1− δ (V (a′, k′)) + a′H (a
′, k′)1−γ V (a′, k′)γ k′γ
k′
−G (a
′, k′)− T c (a′, k′) C (a′, k′)
k′
)
− U` (a′, k′) H (a
′, k′)
k′
]
, (64)
0 = a
(
h
vk
)1−γ
− g − τ
cc
vk
− u`
uc
(1 + τ c)
h
vk
− δv, (65)
0 ≥ u`
uc
− 1
1 + τ c
(1− γ) a
(
vk
h
)γ
, (66)
λ5 ≥ 0, with complementary slackness condition.
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C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We know, e.g. from Coleman (2000), that with v = 1 the Ramsey steady state corresponds
to the first-best steady state. We want to show that this result extends to the case with
endogenous v. It is obvious that τ ct = τ
c
t+1 at the steady state. Then, comparing (39) and
(51) gives τ k = 0. Also, comparing (37) and (13) gives 1−τ
h
1+τc
= 1, hence τh = −τ c. Finally, as
long as consumption is larger than labour income, the only way to raise revenue to finance g
is by setting τ c > 0. Given that τ k = 0, the capital utilisation margin is not distorted, hence
the first-best steady state can be implemented.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
By the usual Kuhn-Tucker argument, if (53) is not satisfied when it is ignored we can impose
it as equality, hence τh = 0. Next, note that at the steady state combining (51) and (53) as
equality gives
1
β
= 1− δ(v) + γvγ
(
h
k
)1−γ
− g − τ
cc
k
.
Then, using this and (53) as equality again, we can rewrite (47) as
0 = λ5γ
u`
uc
+
(
λ2 − λ3 uc
1 + τ c
1
k
− λ4 1
vk
)
(g − τ cc) .
Now, from (46) λ2 − λ3 uc1+τc 1k − λ4 1vk = ug > 0, hence g = τ cc if λ5 = 0. Finally, from (45),
this holds if λ1 = λ2 (1− γ)
(
vk
h
)γ
= λ2w, which obviously holds.
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Figure 1: Ramsey (red dashed line) and Markov (solid blue line) without consumption tax-
ation starting from the Markov steady state
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Figure 2: Ramsey (red dashed line) and Markov (solid blue line) policies with consumption
taxation and no labour subsidy starting from the Markov steady state
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1.51
1.52
1.53
1.54
1.55
1.56
1.57
1.58
Capital
 
 
Discretion
Commitment
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0.0714
0.0715
0.0716
0.0717
0.0718
0.0719
0.072
0.0721
0.0722
Government spending
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0.32
0.3205
0.321
0.3215
0.322
0.3225
0.323
0.3235
Consumption
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0.2745
0.275
0.2755
0.276
0.2765
0.277
Hours
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0.215
0.22
0.225
0.23
Consumption tax rate
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
Capital income tax rate
37
Figure 3: Ramsey (red dashed line) and Markov (solid blue line) policies without consumption
taxation starting from the status quo
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Figure 4: Ramsey (red dashed line) and Markov (solid blue line) policies with consumption
taxation and no labour subsidy starting from the status quo
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Table 5: Tax rates and allocations at steady state with alternative parameter values
unrestricted τh ≥ 0 τ c = 0
Variable Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
ϕ = 0.4
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.223 0.221 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.173
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.078
Capital 1.553 1.466 1.459 1.436 1.273
Hours worked 0.276 0.261 0.261 0.255 0.259
Income 0.494 0.466 0.465 0.457 0.439
Consumption 0.323 0.305 0.305 0.300 0.298
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.136
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.022 0.023 0.032 0.069
ϕ = 1
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.223 0.220 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.125
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.133
Capital 1.648 1.490 1.480 1.437 1.181
Hours worked 0.293 0.265 0.265 0.256 0.265
Income 0.524 0.474 0.472 0.457 0.433
Consumption 0.343 0.310 0.310 0.299 0.302
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.128
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.039 0.041 0.058 0.119
ϕ = 5
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.223 0.221 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.042
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.221
Capital 1.887 1.595 1.588 1.502 1.099
Hours worked 0.336 0.284 0.284 0.267 0.295
Income 0.600 0.507 0.506 0.477 0.449
Consumption 0.392 0.332 0.332 0.312 0.329
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.112
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.066 0.067 0.098 0.208
σ = 2
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.234 0.224 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.253 0.099
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.197
Capital 1.522 1.402 1.380 1.358 1.015
Hours worked 0.271 0.249 0.250 0.242 0.259
Income 0.484 0.446 0.443 0.432 0.402
Consumption 0.317 0.289 0.289 0.279 0.282
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.152 0.150 0.154 0.137
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.031 0.035 0.046 0.147
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Tax rates and allocations at steady state with alternative parameter values (continued)
unrestricted τh ≥ 0 τ c = 0
Variable Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
β = 0.96
Consumption tax rate 3.245 0.223 0.222 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -3.245 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.059
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.202
Capital 3.352 2.882 2.872 2.719 2.039
Hours worked 0.322 0.277 0.277 0.261 0.283
Income 0.732 0.629 0.628 0.593 0.557
Consumption 0.479 0.412 0.411 0.388 0.404
Public spending-income ratio 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.115
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.059 0.060 0.088 0.187
χ = 1.8
Consumption tax rate 4.628 0.223 0.223 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -4.628 0.000 0.000 0.234 0.081
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.0004 0.000 0.172
Capital 1.669 1.435 1.434 1.366 1.071
Hours worked 0.326 0.280 0.280 0.267 0.285
Income 0.583 0.502 0.502 0.478 0.452
Consumption 0.373 0.321 0.321 0.306 0.318
Public spending-income ratio 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.117
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.0560 0.0562 0.081 0.157
αg = 0.3
Consumption tax rate 29.558 0.300 0.297 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -29.558 0.000 0.000 0.303 0.081
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.233
Capital 1.885 1.548 1.537 1.438 1.032
Hours worked 0.335 0.275 0.276 0.256 0.284
Income 0.599 0.492 0.491 0.457 0.428
Consumption 0.369 0.303 0.303 0.281 0.302
Public spending-income ratio 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.141
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.088 0.091 0.135 0.264
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Table 6: Cyclical properties of taxes and allocations, ϕ = 1
τh ≥ 0 τ c = 0
Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
Consumption tax Labour income tax
Mean 0.223 0.220 0.240 0.125
Standard deviation 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.003
Coefficient of variation 0.029 0.022 0.014 0.026
Autocorrelation 0.576 0.594 0.673 0.501
Correlation with output 0.994 0.998 -0.948 -0.870
Capital income tax
Mean 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.133
Standard deviation 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.003
Coefficient of variation 11.983 1.774 30.257 0.023
Autocorrelation 0.576 0.592 0.462 0.501
Correlation with output -0.993 -0.997 -0.763 -0.890
Public spending-income ratio
Mean 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.128
Standard deviation 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003
Coefficient of variation 0.031 0.024 0.027 0.025
Autocorrelation 0.511 0.513 0.514 0.501
Correlation with output -0.860 -0.859 -0.910 -0.877
Output
Mean 0.474 0.473 0.457 0.433
Standard deviation 0.016 0.013 0.018 0.017
Coefficient of variation 0.034 0.027 0.040 0.040
Autocorrelation 0.616 0.619 0.589 0.601
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Table 7: Tax rates and allocations at steady state with exogenous government spending
unrestricted τh ≥ 0 τ c = 0
Variable Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
Consumption tax rate 1.179 0.167 0.165 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -1.179 0.000 0.000 0.240 0.078
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.211
Capital 1.718 1.548 1.541 1.467 1.077
Capital utilisation 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786
Depreciation rate 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064
Hours worked 0.306 0.275 0.276 0.261 0.283
Income 0.546 0.492 0.491 0.466 0.434
Capital-income ratio 3.146 3.146 3.136 3.146 2.481
Consumption 0.381 0.337 0.337 0.305 0.309
Consumption-income ratio 0.697 0.686 0.686 0.654 0.712
Public spending (fixed) 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056
Public spending-income ratio 0.103 0.115 0.115 0.121 0.130
Per-period utility -1.622 -1.657 -1.659 -1.718 -1.765
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.088
Table 8: Tax rates and allocations at steady state with alternative measure of consumption
unrestricted τh ≥ 0 τ c = 0
Variable Ramsey Markov Ramsey Markov
Consumption tax rate 4.718 0.245 0.242 0.000 0.000
Labour income tax rate -4.718 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.070
Capital income tax rate 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.209
Capital 1.701 1.443 1.433 1.359 1.009
Capital utilisation 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786
Depreciation rate 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064
Hours worked 0.303 0.257 0.257 0.242 0.264
Income 0.541 0.459 0.458 0.432 0.405
Capital-income ratio 3.146 3.146 3.132 3.146 2.488
Consumption 0.347 0.295 0.294 0.278 0.291
Consumption-income ratio 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.718
Public spending 0.085 0.072 0.072 0.068 0.050
Public spending-income ratio 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.124
Per-period utility -2.372 -2.437 -2.439 -2.467 -2.559
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0.000 0.067 0.069 0.100 0.206
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